Two ways to order events in time. The B-series orders them by earlier-than and later-than: fixed, permanent relations. Hastings is earlier than Waterloo and always will be; that fact never changes. The A-series orders them by past, present, and future: relations that do change. The signing of the Declaration was once future, became present, sits now in the deep past. The B-series is a timeline you could draw once and never redraw. The A-series is the “now” sliding along it.
McTaggart coined both terms in his 1908 paper and asked exactly your question, giving an answer almost nobody accepts but everyone has to reckon with: neither is real, because time itself is unreal. His argument has two moves. First, the A-series is essential to time, because time requires change, and the only real change is an event’s going from future to present to past. Take the poker that is hot at noon and cold at one. On the B-series alone nothing about it ever changes; “hot at noon” is eternally true, “cold at one” is eternally true, and that ends the matter. Genuine becoming needs the A-series. Second, the A-series is contradictory. Past, present, and future exclude each other, yet every event has all three. Say the obvious thing, that it has them successively, and you have smuggled tense back in (“it is present, will be past, was future”), which needs a second A-series to cash out, which faces the same problem, and the regress runs forever. Essential but incoherent, so time goes.
McTaggart kept one thing, and it answers your question about how the series relate: a C-series, a permanent ordering of events with no direction, no earlier or later, just a sequence. The C-series plus the movement of the A-series’ “now” produces the B-series’ direction. The A-series points the arrow. Strip it out and you have an ordering with no from-and-to, which is not yet time. So on his picture the B-series is derivative, the C-series with a direction borrowed from the A-series.
The live debate keeps his vocabulary and drops his conclusion. A-theorists hold the A-series fundamental: there is an objective, mind-independent fact about what is present, and passage is a real feature of the world. Presentism (only the present exists), the growing block (past and present exist, the future does not yet), and the moving spotlight (all times exist but one is lit) all sit here. B-theorists hold the B-series fundamental: all times are equally real, the block universe just sits there, and “now” is an indexical like “here,” true at the time you say it and carrying no more cosmic weight than “here” carries spatial weight. Passage, on this view, describes how creatures embedded in time experience the block. The block itself does nothing of the sort.
Which is real. I lean B-theory, and the decisive pressure comes from physics rather than from McTaggart. Special relativity has no frame-independent simultaneity, so there is no global “now” that all observers share, and the A-theory needs exactly such a now for its objective present. You can rescue the A-theory by positing a privileged frame that relativity cannot detect, the neo-Lorentzian move, but then you own a metaphysically preferred present that pays no empirical rent. The rate-of-passage worry cuts the same way. Ask how fast time flows and the only available answer, one second per second, is a tautology wearing the costume of a measurement. Passage keeps failing to say what it adds.
The honest cost of the B-theory is that it owes an account of why time so overwhelmingly seems to pass, and that account is not finished. This is the strongest card the A-theorist holds. Prior’s “thank goodness that’s over” is the cleanest version: when the pain stops, your relief is about its pastness, and “it ends earlier than this utterance” cannot capture the relief, because you would feel no relief at a tenseless fact that was always true. The openness of the future and the fixity of the past also read like features of the world rather than of our vantage. B-theorists answer with token-reflexive semantics and psychological stories about memory, accumulating traces, and the entropy gradient, and those stories are good without being knockdown. The felt flow of time remains a debt the B-theory has not fully paid.
Where that leaves me: the B-series is more likely the deep structure of time, the A-series more likely a genuine feature of how time appears from inside it. McTaggart was right that the two cannot both be fundamental and wrong that the tension kills time. The contradiction he found is real. His elimination was too fast.

